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PRICE V. MURDY
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the licensing provision 
of the Maryland Consumer Loan Law (“MCLL”), qualifies as an “other 
specialty.” Price v. Murdy, 462 Md. 145, 158, 198 A.3d 798, 806 
(2018). This qualification is pursuant to the definition stipulated by the 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) and permits exceptions 
to the article’s general three-year statute of limitations for certain 
statutory specialties. Id. at 158, 198 A.3d at 806. The court further 
determined that, as a result of the MCLL’s licensing requirement 
qualifying as a statutory specialty, claims brought under the licensing 
requirement are subject to a twelve-year limitations period. Id. at 158, 
198 A.3d at 806. 
William Price (“Price”) and Frank Chovan (“Chovan”), independent 
of one another, purchased vehicles requiring financing of less than 
$6,000. In order to finance the vehicles, both Price and Chovan took 
out loans from the same lender, Samuel Spicer (“Spicer”). On March 
17, 2017, Price and Chovan filed a class action suit against Spicer 
contending that Spicer had violated the MCLL because he was not 
licensed to enter into the loan agreements. Price and Chovan also 
alleged that Spicer was in violation of the MCLL by failing to give 
notice of vehicle repossession, charging compound interest on loans, 
and requiring payment of exaggerated or unwarranted attorney’s fees. 
The class action suit was filed over three years, but less than twelve 
years, after both Price and Chovan entered into their loan agreements 
with Spicer. The MCLL does not specify a limitations period for claims 
on its provisions. As a result, Price and Chovan argued that the MCLL 
qualified as an “other specialty,” subject to the CJP’s twelve-year 
statute of limitations, and therefore, their suit was timely. Spicer 
disagreed, and asserted that the MCLL failed to qualify as a specialty, 
and thus, the suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. 
The case went before the United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland, where it found that the MCLL’s licensing provision and 
corresponding statute of limitations presented an unresolved question 
of
Maryland law. The court then certified the question to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, for it to determine whether the MCLL’s licensing 
provision qualified as an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) 
subject to the twelve-year limitations period. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its assessment by 
reviewing the historical development of the MCLL’s licensing 
requirement, which was traced back to the General Assembly’s desire 
to increase borrower protections. Price, 462 Md. at 148-49, 198 A.3d 
at 800 (citing 1912 Md. Laws, Chapter 836, at 1621-24). The court 
acknowledged that the MCLL’s failure to prescribe a statute of 
limitations would result in a default application of the CJP’s three-year 
statute of limitations unless an exception applied. Price, 462 Md. at 
150, 198 A.3d at 801 (citing NVR Mortg. Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen, 439 Md. 
427, 439–40, 96 A.3d 202, 209 (2014)). Specifically, the court was 
asked to determine whether the MCLL licensing requirement qualified 
under the CJP’s “other specialty” exception. Price, 462 Md. at 150-51, 
198 A.3d at 801. 
Next, the court explained that in order for a statutorily created cause 
of action to qualify as an “other specialty” it must survive the three- 
prong test set forth in Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder. Price, 462 Md. at 
150-51, 198 A.3d at 801. Under the first prong, the proponent must be
enforcing a statutorily created right, and not one that exists under
common law; prong two, mandates that the remedy be sanctioned by
statute rather than the common law; and prong three permits civil
damages, provided that they are fixed, liquidated, or capable of being
readily determined by clear statutory criteria. Price, 462 Md. at 151,
198 A.3d at 801 (citing Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51, 70,
972 A.2d 864, 875 (2009)). The court noted that the opinion would 
focus on the first and third prongs in light of the parties’ stipulation that 
the second prong had been met. Price, 462 Md. at 154, 198 A.3d at 803. 
With respect to the first prong, the court first addressed Spicer’s 
argument, that the licensing requirement was not created by the MCLL 
but rather was derived from a common law right of redress for usurious 
loans. Price, 462 Md. at 154, 198 A.3d at 803. The court first looked 
to Maryland precedent, which established the MCLL’s licensing 
requirement was indeed a statutorily created provision. Price, 462 Md. 
at 155, 198 A.3d at 803-04 (citing Crowder, 409 Md. at 58 & 72, 972 
A.2d at 876 (2009)). The court noted that a review of the licensing
requirement’s language revealed that usury was not mentioned. Price,
462 Md. at 155, 198 A.3d at 804 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §
12-302 (West)). Moreover, analyzing the language of the MCLL and
its precursor laws confirmed that its provisions were created as gap filler
protections for borrowers where the common law’s usury safeguards 
had failed. Price, 462 Md. at 155, 198 A.3d at 804 (citing 1918 Md. 
Laws, Chapter 88, at 198). The court rationalized that acceptance of 
Spicer’s position would be tantamount to reducing the MCLL’s 
function to usury regulation, which would contradict the law’s intended 
purpose of expanding borrower protections beyond that of usury law. 
Price, 462 Md. at 155, 198 A.3d at 804. Ultimately rejecting Spicer’s 
argument, the court held that the first prong had been met. Id. at 156, 
198 A.3d at 804. 
Next, the court addressed the third prong and Spicer’s contention that 
the MCLL’s language failed to provide how damages should be 
determined. Price, 462 Md. at 156, 198 A.3d at 804. Spicer’s argument 
was based on the MCLL’s licensing provision, which prohibits 
unlicensed lenders from receiving unspecified types of compensation. 
Id. at 156, 198 A.3d at 804 (citing Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 12-314 
(West)). Spicer’s position was that because the MCLL does not spell 
out the proscribed forms of compensation, damages stemming from the 
statutory specialty are not readily ascertainable. Price, 462 Md. at 156- 
57, 198 A.3d at 805. Price and Chovan rebutted this argument, claiming 
that fact-finding is often required in determining what damages may 
arise from statutory specialties. Id. at 157, 198 A.3d at 805. 
Agreeing with Price and Chovan, the court determined that the need 
for fact-finding would not prevent damages from being readily 
ascertainable. Price, 462 Md. at 157, 198 A.3d at 805. The court 
rationalized that the third prong was satisfied because the loan 
documents would permit the fact-finder to readily determine both 
liability and the resulting damages. Id. at 157, 198 A.3d at 805. With 
satisfaction of the Crowder Test, the court ultimately answered the 
federal court’s certified question in the affirmative, holding that the 
MCLL’s licensing requirement qualified as a statutory specialty within 
the meaning of CJP § 5-102(a)(6), and therefore, was subject to a 
twelve-year statute of limitations. Id. at 158, 198 A.3d at 806. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that the MCLL’s 
licensing requirement qualifies as an “other specialty”, thus solidifying 
its operation as an independent source of borrower protection and 
removing any doubts as to how the law should be interpreted by the 
courts. Small loan borrowers, who often face financial hardships, will 
now be afforded additional time to gather the necessary resources to 
bring their claims. This holding reinforces the legislative intent behind 
the MCLL of ensuring that borrowers seeking justice under the 
licensing requirement are afforded the MCLL’s full range of statutory 
safeguards. Small loan lenders are now on notice that operating without 
a license is not only illegal but also places them in a disadvantageous 
position by allowing borrowers to bring claims within twelve years. 
